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Abstract
In this paper we define the overflow problem of a network coding storage system in which the
encoding parameter and the storage parameter are mismatched. Through analyses and experiments,
we first show the impacts of the overflow problem in a network coding scheme, which not only
waste storage spaces, but also degrade coding efficiency. To avoid the overflow problem, we then
develop the network coding based secure storage (NCSS) scheme. Thanks to considering both
security and storage requirements in encoding procedures and distributed architectures, the NCSS
can improve the performance of a cloud storage system from both the aspects of storage cost and
coding processing time. We analyze the maximum allowable stored encoded data under the perfect
secrecy criterion, and provide the design guidelines for the secure cloud storage system to enhance
coding efficiency and achieve the minimal storage cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding is an attractive solution for secure cloud storage because of achieving
the unconditional security. As long as protecting partial network coded data, a non-collusive
eavesdropper cannot decode any symbol even with huge computing power for infinite time
[1]. In principle, network coding simply mixes the data from different network nodes based on
the well-designed linear combination rules. Hence, almost incurring no bandwidth expansion
is another advantage of network coding.
A secure cloud storage using network coding is illustrated in Fig. 1. The original file is
split into smaller chunks of symbols, each of which is encoded by Vandermonde matrix [2].
The different subsets of the encoded data are stored to two cloud databases. A legitimate
user with access to two cloud databases can recover the entire original file. However, an
eavesdropper with access to only one of the two cloud databases is unable to decode any of
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Fig. 1. An example of secure cloud storage using network coding.
the original symbols [3]. In summary, the network coding storage system consists of three
procedures: splitting, encoding, and distributing to storage nodes.
Nevertheless, a secure network coding storage system may encounter a practical design
issue when encoding parameters (such as the size of encoding matrix) is not jointly designed
with the storage parameters (such as the storage size per node). If the mismatch between
encoding and storage parameters occurs, it can cause bandwidth expansion and redundant
computation cost. We coin the term the overflow problem for secure network coding storage
system in this paper because the mismatch of encoding and storage parameters results in
extended length of coded data in the format of digits.
Table I shows an example of the overflow problem for binary digits, where A is the
encoding matrix for network coding, bi and ci are the original data, and network coded data,
respectively. Assume that c1 and c3 are stored in the first database, and c2 is stored in the
second database. We can see that the bit length of coded ci is larger than that of bi for
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3TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF THE OVERFLOW PROBLEM FOR BINARY DIGITS
A b c


1 1 1
5 1 2
6 1 4


(0, 1, 1)T (2, 3, 5)T =(10, 11, 101)T
i = 1 ∼ 3. Also, the minimum bit length required for storing c1 and c3 is three in the first
database, but in the second database the minimum bit length for storing c2 is two.
To overcome the overflow problem, we propose a systematic design methodology to
calculate the important system parameters of a network-coded cloud storage system. The
major objective of the proposed scheme is to provide correct mapping between the encoding
parameters and the storage parameters. The contributions of this work are explained as
follows.
• Formulate the overflow problem of a network-coded cloud storage system, and perform
experiments to show the impacts of the overflow problem, which not only waste storage
spaces, but degrade computational efficiency.
• Propose a network coding based secure storage (NCSS) scheme to solve the overflow
problem. To our best knowledge, the overflow problem for a network-coded storage
system has not been investigated in the literature yet.
• Derive the upper bound of the amount of encoded data that can be stored in cloud
databases to achieve the unconditional security level (i.e., perfect secrecy). Based on
the derived upper bound, we present the analysis of storage cost minimization in the
proposed NCSS scheme subject to different security levels.
• Finally, based on the experimental results, we suggest the design guidelines for deter-
mining important system parameters (e.g., the size of the encoding matrix) to accelerate
the network coding process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related works. In Section
III, we formulate the overflow problem in cloud storage using network coding. In Section IV,
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4we present the NCSS scheme. In Section V we give the security and storage analyses of the
proposed scheme. Section VI shows the experimental results. Finally, we give our concluding
remarks in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Network coding can be viewed as a generalized store-and-forward network routing princi-
ple. Messages from different source nodes are combined and regenerated at the intermediate
nodes according to algebraic encoding. Besides the well-known advantages of throughput
enhancement [4]–[6] and data robustness [7], the recent studies on network coding focus on
reliability and security enhancement.
A. Network Coding for Data Recovery
Network coding can improve the efficiency of data recovery process when storage nodes
fail in distributed storage systems. It was proved that the data recovery problem of distributed
storage systems is equivalent to the multicasting problem of network routing [8]. The authors
of [9] designed a cooperative network coding recovery mechanism for multiple node failures.
A proxy-based multiple cloud storage system with the feature of fault tolerance was built
based on the network coding storage scheme [10]. A network coding method called Re-
generating Code was proposed to improve the repair process of distributed storage systems
[11]. Different from erasure coding, the repaired data fragments are mixed in intermediate
nodes, thereby reducing the repair bandwidth. The authors of [12] applied network coding
to optimize the reliability performance of frequently accessed data in cloud storage systems.
B. Network Coding for Data Security
Another research area of network coding is to prevent data being eavesdropped during
transmission. The information-theoretical security problem for an untrusted channel was first
discussed in [13]. A network coding system was built to prove that a wiretapper cannot
obtain any information from the transmitted message [14]. A weaker type of security issue
was investigated in [15], where a node can decode packets only after receiving sufficient
linear independent encoded data. The construction of a secure linear network code for a
wiretap network was presented in [16].
The secrecy capacity for a network-coded cloud storage system was investigated in [17],
[18], where the secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum amount of data that can be
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5securely stored under the perfect secrecy condition. The perfect secrecy condition ensure the
eavesdropper cannot obtain any information of source data. The secrecy capacity for nodes
with different storage capacities was derived in [19]. The coding scheme that can achieve
the storage upper bound of secrecy capacity was proposed in [20]. The maximum data size
being stored under the perfect secrecy condition for any number of eavesdropped nodes was
determined in [21]. The authors of [22] considered how to achieve the information-theoretical
secrecy when an eavesdropper can access some data in the storage nodes.
For secure storage over multiple clouds, similar to this work, the authors of [3] proposed
a security protection scheme to ensure that no symbols can be decoded by an eavesdropper,
which is weaker than perfect secrecy. In [23], a link eavesdropping problem in a network-
coded cloud storage system was investigated. A publicly verifiable protocol for network coded
cloud storage was proposed in [24].
C. Objective of This Paper
Different from the previous works focusing on the security and reliability enhancement of
network coding, in this paper we focus on the storage efficiency and perfect security when
applying network coding in multiple untrusted clouds. We define the overflow problem when
network coding is applied in a cloud storage system, which has not been discussed previously.
The overflow problem will result in extra extended encrypted data in the format of digits
during encoding process, thereby increasing storage and computation cost. To overcome the
overflow problem, we develop a systematic design methodology for calculating the encoding
and storage parameters of a network-coded cloud storage system. Based on the proposed
method, we further solve the storage cost optimization problem under the perfect secrecy
constraint. The ultimate goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the performance of a network-
coded cloud storage system can be improved by jointly designing the encoding and storage
and parameters.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Now we describe the coding scheme adopted in this paper and give the formal definition
of the overflow problem.
A. Coding Scheme
Consider the original data vector b = (b1, . . . , bn)
T with base d, where elements bi are
independent random integers uniformly distributed over {0, . . . , d− 1}. We use the terms
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6original data and plaintext data interchangeably in this paper. The goal of a cloud user is
to securely store b to multiple cloud databases. To achieve this goal, we adopt the same
network coding scheme as [3], in which the input data are mapped to encoded symbols by
linear transformation.
Denote A as an n × n Vandermonde matrix, where [Ai,j ] = (a
i−1
j ). A is used for the
encoding matrix, where all the coefficients ai are distinct nonzero elements over a finite
field Fq, q = 2
k > n. Note that A can be a (n +m) × n matrix, where the the amount of
redundancy m depends on the reliability requirement of the storage system.
A cloud user encodes data c = (c1, . . . , cn)
T = Ab and splits the encoded data into p parts.
We assume the cloud user can arbitrarily store any piece of the encoded data to any cloud
database. Let c˜i(i = 1, . . . , p) be the encoded data vector stored in the i-th cloud database.
A legitimate user can collect c˜i from the cloud databases and obtain the original data by
performing A−1c.
B. Security Model
Assume that an eavesdropper has infinite computing power, but can access only one cloud
database. Also, it is assumed that the eavesdropper can have the full information about
the encoding and decoding schemes, including the knowledge of the encoding matrix. The
objective of an eavesdropper is to guess the original data. Although we consider only one
eavesdropper in this paper, our result can be extended to the case of multiple eavesdroppers.
In our considered cloud storage system, every cloud database can support different security
levels [25]. Denote Pei as the probability that the i-th cloud database can resist attacks. Also,
the cloud user specifies a security requirement Pu, which represents the maximum probability
that an eavesdropper can guess the original data. Next, we will show how to solve the overflow
problem subject to the constraints of the security requirement when considering distributing
encoded symbols to multiple cloud databases.
C. Overflow Problem
Although it was proved that the aforementioned network coding scheme can help prevent
eavesdroppers from obtaining the information of the original data [1], the overflow problem
occurs from the encoding process and the storage process. Specifically, if the encoding
parameter and the storage parameter are mismatched, the length of encoded data in digital
format may become larger than the length of the original data in digital format. As a result,
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7TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF THE DEFINITIONS FOR OVERFLOW PROBLEM
A b c c˜1 = (c1, c3) c˜2 = (c2) strictly non-overflow 3-bounded non-overflow
Case1


1 1 1
5 1 2
6 1 4


(0, 1, 0)T (1, 1, 1)T (1, 1) (1) Yes Yes
Case2


1 1 1
5 1 2
6 1 4


(0, 1, 1)T (10, 11, 101)T (10, 101) (11) No Yes
storage spaces are wasted due to redundant encoded data. Now we formally state this problem
by introducing the following definition.
Definition 1 (Strictly Non-overflow) Let ld(a) be the number of digits that represents a in
base d. A piece of encoded data c = (c1, . . . , cn)
T is considered to be strictly non-overflow
if and only if ld(ci) ≤ ld(bi) for every i. Thus, the length of the encoded data is equal to that
of the plaintext data.
Definition 2 (α-bounded Non-overflow) Let |c˜i| denote the number of elements in c˜i. A
piece of encoded data c = (c1, . . . , cn)
T is considered to be α-bounded Non-overflow if and
only if
|c˜i|∑
j=1
ld(cj) ≤ |c˜i|αld(bi) ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Assume the encoded data are randomly stored in cloud databases. Hence, the increasing
cost of storage or computation resources caused by data extension can be measured by the
extension degree α = ld(ci)
ld(bi)
of the encoded data in the cloud database. Table II show the
coding results for the two different overflow cases where d = 2 and p = 2. In case 1 there
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8TABLE III
NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notations Descriptions
b Original data array
d Base of bi
ld(a) Number of digits that represents a in base d
A Encoding matrix
k Use Galois Field size 2k for A
n Matrix size of A
p Total number of cloud databases
c Encoded data vector
c˜i Encoded data vector that stored in the i-th cloud database
|c˜i| Number of elements in c˜i
si Number of digits in bi
b
′ Regrouped data array
r Size of b′
Pei Probability of the i-th cloud database can resist attacks
Pg Probability that an eavesdropper can guess the original data
Pu Security requirement: Maximum probability that an eavesdropper can guess the original data
are no redundant digits after the encoding process, but in case 2 the extension degree is
bounded by 3.
IV. NETWORK CODING BASED SECURE STORAGE (NCSS) SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the overflow problem of a network-coded cloud storage system.
We first give the criteria to choose the proper length of the data element to be encoded. Next,
we present the data distribution method for achieving the required security level. Finally, we
describe the system design methods of the NCSS scheme. Table III summarizes the notations
used in this paper.
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9A. Coding Analysis
The following theorem can help calculate the encoding parameters to avoid the overflow
problem of the secure network coding storage system.
Theorem 1 Let si be the number of digits in bi. Then, the system is strictly non-overflow if
si = s =
k
log2d
.
Proof: First, we assume that si <
k
log2d
. Then, we have
k
log2d
= klogd2 = logd2
k . (1)
Because the coding process is manipulated with integers, we have si ≤ logd(2
k − 1). Since
ci is distributed over
{
0, . . . , 2k − 1
}
, the maximum number of digits used to represent an
encoded element is ld(ci)max = logd(2
k − 1). Furthermore, the number of digits in bi can be
represented as ld(bi). Thus, we have
si = ld(bi) ≤ logd(2
k − 1) = ld(ci)max . (2)
As a result, the overflow problem occurs because the length of encoded data may be larger
than the length of the original data. Secondly, we assume that si >
k
log2d
. We take ex-
ponentiation with base d on both sides and we have dsi > dlogd2
k
= 2k from (1). Since
bi = d
si , it contradicts the fact that the maximum value of bi is 2
k−1. Hence, it follows that
si = s =
k
log
2
d
.
Theorem 2 The system is α-bounded non-overflow if si ≥
1
α
logd(2
k − 1) for every i.
Proof: Since si = ld(bi) and ld(ci)max = logd(2
k − 1), we have
|c˜i|∑
j=1
ld(cj) ≤ |c˜i| logd(2
k − 1)
=α ·
1
α
|c˜i| logd(2
k − 1)
≤α |c˜i| si
=α |c˜i| ld(bi) . (3)
Theorem 1 and 2 give the criteria of selecting the length of the plaintext data element.
Next, we relate the security requirement to the amount of encoded stored data.
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Theorem 3 The system satisfies the security requirement Pu if
|c˜i|∑
j=1
ld(c˜i(j)) ≤
n∑
t=1
ld(ct) + logdPu−logd(1−Pei) ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Proof: Recall that an eavesdropper can access only one cloud database. Hence, the
probability Pg that an eavesdropper can guess the original data is the product of the invasion
probability of the cloud database and the probability of guessing the remaining encoded
digits. It follows that
Pg= (1−Pei)d
−

 n∑
t=1
ld(ct)−
|c˜i|∑
j=1
ld(c˜i(j))


≤ (1−Pei)d
logdPu−logd(1−Pei )
= Pu . (4)
B. System Design
The proposed NCSS scheme can be divided into three steps. First, a dynamic-length
alphabet representation of network coded data is adopted based on Theorem 1 and Theorem
2. Second, the original data are preprocessed and regrouped before the encoding process.
Third, the regrouped data are encoded and distributed to the corresponding cloud databases.
Figure 2 shows the system flow of the proposed NCSS scheme. Assume that a cloud
user wants to store a single-digit data array b = (b1, . . . , bm)
T with base d to the p cloud
databases. We first choose a power k for the field characteristics according to the following
condition.
Condition 1 2k ≥ d
The field size must be larger than the maximal value of the data array element d−1. Otherwise,
some data elements cannot be represented in the field. After that, a proper length of data el-
ements si can be decided according to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. This step is called dynamic
length alphabet representation. We then regroup b to b′ = (b1...bs1 , bs1+1...bs1+s2, · · · , bsˆr−1+1...bsˆr)
based on the value of si, where sˆr
∆
=
r∑
i=1
si. Next, we generate an n× n encoding matrix A
with the following condition.
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Fig. 2. System flow of NCSS scheme.
Condition 2 n < 2k and n ≤ r
Since matrixA is constructed from n distinct elements over the Galois Field, we have n < 2k.
In addition, the matrix multiplication cannot be operated if the size of encoding matrix is
larger than the size of regrouped data array. We then encode b′ withA and obtain the encoded
data array c = (c1, . . . , cn)
T . Finally, c can be regrouped to c˜ by Theorem 3, which specifies
the maximum amount of encoded data that can be stored in a cloud database according to
user’s security requirement. Finally, the elements of c˜ are distributed to the corresponding p
cloud databases.
Table IV shows an example of the proposed NCSS scheme in the strictly non-overflow
case. We assume that the original data is b = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) and the encoded data are
stored to two cloud databases with Pe1 = 0.5, Pe2 = 0.25, and Pu =
1
64
. From Theorem 3,
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TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF ADOPTING NCSS SCHEME IN STORING ENCODED DATA TO TWO CLOUD DATABASES
b d k s b′ r n A c c˜
(0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 2 3 3 (001, 011, 101) 3 3


1 1 1
5 1 2
6 1 4


(010, 100, 001) (0101, 00001)
the maximal numbers of digits that can be stored in the first and the second cloud database
are 4 and 5, respectively.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed NCSS scheme in terms of security level and
storage cost. First, we discuss the issue of enhancing security level from a system design
aspect. Then we derive the upper bound of data size that can be stored in the cloud under
the constraint of perfect secrecy.
To begin with, from (4) we know that the lower bound of the security requirement Pu is
(1−Pei)d
−

 n∑
t=1
ld(ct)−
|C˜i|∑
j=1
ld(c˜i(j))


≤ Pu .
Since ld(ct) is proportional to the size of Galois Field, it is anticipated that a larger size
of encoding matrix n and a large value of power k of the field characteristics can result
in a higher security level for the network coding storage system. However, increasing these
encoding parameters can result extra coding complexity. Next, we show that the security
level can be enhanced to the perfect secrecy by storing a certain amount of encoded data in
the local machine. The notion of perfect secrecy represents that an eavesdropper can get no
information of the original message.
Definition 3 (Perfect Secrecy Criterion [26]) Let S denote the random variable associated
with the secret data fragments and E denote the random variable associated encoded frag-
ments observed by the eavesdropper. The perfect secrecy requires
H(S|E) = H(S) ,
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where H(X) represents the entropy of a random variable X .
In the worst case, an eavesdropper can access the encoded data of all the cloud databases.
The following theorem can be applied to specify the maximal amount of encoded data
fragments that can be stored in the cloud, while keeping the rest of data in a local machine
to ensure perfect secrecy.
Theorem 4 Assume that w-digit secret information is encoded with n−w-digit data b. For
both strictly non-overflow and α-bounded non-overflow schemes, a cloud user can store at
most
n∑
j=1
ld(cj)− w digits of encoded data to the cloud under the perfect secrecy criterion.
Proof: Let e(h) represent a subset containing any h components of vector e. We use
ei:j to denote the subvector formed from the i-th to the j-th position of vector e. The set of
rows from the i-th to the j-th position of matrix D is represented as Di:j . In addition, bi are
independent random variables uniformly distributed over Fq with entropy H(bi) = H(b).
For simplicity, without loss of generality, assume that t contiguous components of the
encoded data cp+1:p+t are stored to the clouds. Then we can obtain
H(b(w)) = H(b(w)|cp+1:p+t)−H(b
(w)|c) (5)
= I(b(w); c)− I(b(w); cp+1:p+t) (6)
= H(c)−H(cp+1:p+t)−H(c|b
(w)) +H(cp+1:p+t|b
(w)) (7)
≤ H(c)−H(cp+1:p+t) . (8)
In the above equations, (5) holds because of the perfect secrecy criterion and due to the fact
that the secret information can be reconstructed if the entire codewords are given. In (8), we
have H(cp+1:p+t|b
(w))−H(c|b(w)) ≤ 0 since
H(c|b(w))−H(cp+1:p+t|b
(w)) = H(cp+t+1:n|b
(w), cp+1:p+t) .
Since bi are i.i.d random variables, it follows that
H(b(w)) = H
(
bseq(1), bseq(2), . . . , bseq(w)
)
= wH(b) , (9)
where seq(j) is the j-th element of a random integer sequence within the range 1 to n.
Because the encoded data vector c contains the entire information of b at most, we can
July 21, 2018 DRAFT
14
obtain
H(c) ≤ nH(b) . (10)
Moreover, the n× n Vandermonde matrix A is nonsingular [2]. Thus the eavesdropper can
apply the Gaussian elimination to obtain the reduced row echelon form of the submatrix S,
whose elements are [Si,j] = [Ai,j] for p+1 ≤ i, j ≤ p+ t. The Eavesdropper Reduced Matrix
M can be obtained as
Mp+1:p+t =


m
p
1
...
m
p+t−1
1
...
...
...
|
|
|
It
|
|
|
...
...
...
mpn
...
mp+t−1n

 , (11)
where the other element of M are the same as A. Hence, the eavesdropper have t equations
to solve n unknown elements. It implies that
H(cp+1:p+t) = tH(b) . (12)
Substituting (9), (12) and (10) into (8), we obtain
tH(b) ≤ nH(b)− wH(b) . (13)
The above equation shows that we can store at most the n−w components of encoded data
to the clouds under perfect secrecy criterion. For the strictly non-overflow scheme, we have
only one digit in each component of encoded data. Thus, we can store at most
n∑
j=1
ld(cj)−w
digits of encoded data to the clouds, while keeping the remaining w digits in the local
machines. However, we may have multiple digits in each component of encoded data for
α-bounded non-overflow scheme. Let e(h˜) represent a subset containing any w fragmentary
components of vector e. With at least n unknown digits, knowing c(w˜) cannot help solve b.
As a result, it follows that
I
(
c
(w˜);b
)
= 0 . (14)
Not that we still have t equations to solve n unknown elements. That is,
H(b(w)|cp+1:p+t, c
(w˜)) = H(b(w)|cp+1:p+t) . (15)
Finally, we obtain
I
(
cp+1:p+t, c
(w˜);b(w)
)
= I
(
cp+1:p+t;b
(w)
)
. (16)
Consequently, we can select w digits of encoded data from different w components, i.e.,
select one digit for each component. These w-digit encoded data can be stored in the local
machines, while the remaining
n∑
j=1
ld(cj)− w digits are stored to the clouds.
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VI. STORAGE MINIMIZATION
We are motivated to analyze the amount of stored encrypted data with the security require-
ment in terms of the probability that an eavesdropper can correctly guess the original data.
This is because only a certain amount of encoded data fragments can be stored in the local
machines to enhance the security level, as shown in the previous section. As the required
security level increases, the amount of encoded data stored at the local site should increase.
A. Solving Storage Minimization Problem
Consider a cloud user keeps encoded data with length l in each encoding operation and
stores the remaining encoded data to p cloud databases as shown in Fig. 3. We assume all the
cloud databases have the same capability of preventing attacks (i.e., Pei=Pe) and the security
requirement is Pu, which specifies the maximum probability that an eavesdropper can guess
the original message. In addition to the encoded data, the encoding matrix is stored at the
local site.
The storage cost at the local site is the function of encoding matrix size n and the amount
of encoded data stored at a local machine for every encoding operation, denoted by l. Let m
denote the length of the original message and α represent the number of encoding operations.
Subject to a given security requirement Pu, the storage cost minimization problem is expressed
as
minimize f(n, l) = n2s+ αl
subject to (1− Pe)
pd−αl 6 Pu
2 6 n 6 2k
l 6 n
αns = m
n, l ∈ Z+ , (17)
where s is defined in Theorem 1. Note that an eavesdropper can guess the original message
only if he/she can invade all the cloud databases and guess the encoded data in the local
machine. It is observed that the optimization problem is nonconvex even if we relax the
noncovex constraints n, l ∈ Z+. The complete algorithm for solving this optimization problem
is given in the Appendix.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of a user keeping a certain amount of encoded data at the local site to enhance security protection.
B. Discussions
Figure 4 shows the optimal parameter setting for encoding matrix size n versus the original
message length m for d = 2, Pe = 0.5, p = 3, and Pu = 10
−6. As the message length
increases, the size of the encoding matrix increases. A smaller encoding matrix size is
preferred if Galois field size is large. Due to the integer constraints in the optimization
problem, the encoding matrix size increases in a step-like function.
Figure 5 shows the storage cost f(n, l) versus message length m for d = 2, Pe = 0.5, and
p = 3. Intuitively, we need more storage space for lower Pu. However, the storage cost with
various Pu are the same when m exceeds certain threshold. This is because the considered
system is in the case of lower bound cost (i.e., l = 1). Noteworthily, a larger k can yield a
smaller lower bound cost when m > 1000. In a general setting k ∈ [8, 16] [27]. For m < 1000
it is suggested that the value of k is set to k = 8; otherwise, k = 16.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Since the encoding process is performed on local machines, processing delay may be
performance bottlenecks. Thus, it is of importance to investigate the impact of the system
design parameters on the delay performance when considering a secure network coding
storage scheme. We performed experiments on a commodity computer with an Intel Core i5
processor running at 2.4 GHz, 8 GB of RAM, and a 5400 RPM Hitachi 500 GB Serial ATA
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drive with an 8 MB buffer.
Figure 6 shows the multiplication processing time of the network coding storage system
with different sizes of Galois Field. Although the complexity for the network coding is
O(n2) modular multiplication, our result shows that the field size has only slight impact on
the processing time, which supports our design methodology of selecting k. Specifically, it
indicates the possibility that the security level can be enhanced significantly by selecting an
appropriate design of k but only pay a very small computational cost.
Figure 7 shows the processing time between the strictly non-overflow and the α-bounded
non-overflow schemes for 2MB file with p = 2, where α = 5. The processing time is
longer for a smaller n or k since the numbers of encoding times increase. As a result, the
system spends more time in I/O operations and fetching data between the kernel and user [7].
Compared to the strictly non-overflow scheme, the α-bounded non-overflow scheme requires
more computation cost. The α-bounded non-overflow scheme costs more than 11 times and
22 times of the processing time than that of the strictly non-overflow scheme when k = 16
and 8, respectively. Finally, the best performance is achieved when n > 100 for both non-
overflow schemes. Because increasing n results in a larger cost than increasing k, we suggest
to fix n = 100 and adjust k to meet the security requirements.
Figure 8 compares the processing time of the strictly non-overflow and the α-bounded non-
overflow schemes versus the power of Galois Field characteristic k. As shown in the figure,
the strictly non-overflow scheme is preferable to the α-bounded non-overflow scheme. It is
noteworthy that k has negligible effect on the processing time of the strictly non-overflow
scheme while it has a great impact on that of the α-bounded non-overflow scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the overflow problem in a network coding cloud storage
system. When the overflow problem occurs, it does not only require more storage spaces
but increases the processing time in encoding. We developed the network coding based
secure storage (NCSS) scheme. A systematic approach for the optimal encoding and storage
parameters was provided to solve the overflow problem and minimize the storage cost. We
also derived an analytical upper bound for the maximal allowable stored data in the cloud
nodes under perfect secrecy criterion. Our experimental results demonstrated that encoding
efficiency in terms of processing time can be improved by jointly design of the encoding and
the storage system parameters. More importantly, we suggested the key design guidelines for
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secure network coding storage systems to optimize the performance tradeoff among security
requirement, storage cost per node, and encoding processing time. In the future research, we
will further incorporate the factors of user budgets and file recovery into the secure network
coding distributed storage system.
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APPENDIX
Here we first show that the original storage cost minimization (17) is not convex even when
the integer constraint is relaxed. Then we give the algorithm for solving the optimization
problem by minimizing over separated variables.
Theorem 5 The objective function of the original storage cost minimization (17) is not
convex.
Proof: We consider the case of strictly non-overflow scheme. Substituting si = s =
k
log2d
into (17), the original storage cost minimization is equivalent to
minimize f˜(n, l) =
k
log2d
n2 +
mlog2d
k
n−1l
subject to −
k
mlog2d
logd
Pu
(1− Pc)
pn 6 l 6 n
2 6 n 6 2k
n, l ∈ Z+ . (18)
Then we prove the theorem by showing that the Hessian matrix of the objective function is
not positive semidefinite. The Hessian matrix of f˜(n, l) is
H(f˜) =

 2a+ 2bln−3 −bn−2
−bn−2 0

 ,
where a = k
log2d
> 0 and b = mlog2d
k
> 0. Then, we solve the characteristic equation
det(H(f˜)− λI) = λ2 − (2a+ 2bln−3)λ− b2n−4 = 0 .
We can obtain
λ =
2a+ 2bln−3 ±
√
(2a+ 2bln−3)2 + 4b2n−4
2
.
Since the eigenvalues of H(f˜) is not all positive, H(f˜) is not positive semidefinite. Thus f˜
is not convex.
We are now ready for solving the equivalent optimization problem (18) by minimizing
over separated variables. Define f˜ ∗(n, l) , min
n∈B,l∈A
f˜ and l∗ , argmin
l∈A
f˜(n, l), where A =
{x|x ∈ Z+, nk
mlog2d
logd
Pu
(1−Pc)
p 6 x < n} and B = {x|x ∈ Z+, 2 6 x < 2k}. We first minimize
over n
f˜ ∗(n, l) = min
n∈B
{x|x = min
l∈A
f˜(n, l)} .
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Since min
l∈A
f˜(n, l) is a linear function with one variable in Z1++ for fixed n and the coefficient
is positive, we obtain
l∗ = min{A} =
⌈
−nk
mlog2d
logd
Pu
(1− Pc)
p
⌉
.
As a result, we can solve the optimization problem iteratively as:
• Step 0: Initiate C = ∅ and B = {x|x ∈ Z+, 2 6 x < 2k}.
• Step 1: Select n ∈ B and set l =
⌈
−nk
mlog2d
logd
Pu
(1−Pc)
p
⌉
.
• Step 2: Calculate c = f˜(n, l).
• Step 3: Set C = C ∪ {c} and B = B− {n}.
• Step 4: Iterate 1 to 4 until B = ∅.
• Step 5: Obtain f˜ ∗(n, l) = min{C}.
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